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Abstract
Poultry production has significantly increased worldwide, along with the number of avian
influenza (AI) outbreaks and the potential threat for human pandemic emergence. The role
of wild bird movements in this global spread has been extensively studied while the role of
animal, human and fomite movement within commercial poultry production and trade net-
works remains poorly understood. The aim of this work is to better understand these roles in
relation to the different routes of AI spread. A scoping literature review was conducted
according to the PRISMA guidelines (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews
and Meta-Analyses) using a search algorithm combining twelve domains linked to AI spread
and animal/human movements within poultry production and trade networks. Only 28 out of
3,978 articles retrieved dealt especially with the role of animal, human and fomite move-
ments in AI spread within the international trade network (4 articles), the national trade net-
work (8 articles) and the production network (16 articles). While the role of animal
movements in AI spread within national trade networks has been largely identified, human
and fomite movements have been considered more at risk for AI spread within national pro-
duction networks. However, the role of these movements has never been demonstrated
with field data, and production networks have only been partially studied and never at inter-
national level. The complexity of poultry production networks and the limited access to pro-
duction and trade data are important barriers to this knowledge. There is a need to study the
role of animal and human movements within poultry production and trade networks in the
global spread of AI in partnership with both public and private actors to fill this gap.
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Introduction
World poultry meat production increased by 21.3 million tonnes between 2010–2017 [1]. The
United States, Brazil, China and the European Union are the biggest poultry producers in the
world [1] with chicken accounting for the most produced meat worldwide since 2016 [2]. Pork
and poultry are the most consumed meats worldwide, with about 16kg per capita [2]. Poultry
also represents the biggest meat trade [2]. The main poultry meat exporting countries are Bra-
zil, United States, European Union and Thailand. Whereas China, Japan, Mexico and Saudi
Arabia import the highest volume of poultry meat [1].
Low and high pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI and HPAI respectively) are dissem-
inated worldwide. While AI viruses were identified at the end of the nineteen century the
number of outbreaks caused by HPAI has shown an upward trend since the last years of the
twentieth-century [3]. In 1996, A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (H5N1), the precursor of cur-
rently circulating H5N1 HPAI viruses was identified in farmed geese in southern China. Since
then the large majority of HPAI outbreaks around the world have been related to these H5N1
HPAI viruses [4]. AI outbreaks have mainly been reported in Asia, and to a lesser extent in
Africa, North America and Europe [5]. No outbreaks were reported on the South American
continent between 2010 and 2016. H5N1 remains the most dominant AI virus subtype, among
reported outbreaks; however, it is worth mentioning that only outbreaks caused by HPAI and
LPAI H5-H7 have to be officially notified to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).
During the period 2010–2016, the reported outbreaks mainly referred to commercial farms,
followed by wild bird species and backyard domestic poultry [5]. AI introduction and global
dissemination via wild birds have been extensively studied [6–11]. Similarly, the subsequent
dissemination and spread of AI within or between farms is highly documented [12–17].
Only a limited number of studies have looked into the respective roles of the different poul-
try production networks in the emergence and spread of AI. A recent review has highlighted
that intensive poultry production networks increase the probability of mutation of LPAI to a
HPAI and shown that the type of mutation (conversion or reassortment) is influenced by the
type of production networks (developed or transitioning) [18]. Two studies in Egypt and
China have shown links between the increase of the poultry production and the increase of AI
outbreaks [19,20]. One of these studies made a further analysis suggesting that this link could
be applied at the global level [20]. More generally, relationships between economic growth,
globalization, emerging and global spread of diseases including AI have been described
[21,22].
Limited attention has been drawn to the risk of local and international dissemination of AI
via poultry production and trade networks. Poultry production networks encompass all actors
of commercial poultry production from hatchery to slaughterhouse, including commercial
farms, and the links between them. They involve live bird movements at different stages of
production (e.g. hatching eggs, day-old chicks, adult birds, etc.) along with human worker
movements. These movements can take place at local, national but also international level.
Poultry trade networks encompass all actors of the commercial live poultry trade between
poultry production networks or from poultry production networks to consumers. They
involve live bird movements along with human trader movements. As for the movements of
poultry production networks, these can take place at local, national and international level.
The potential spread of HPAI (via live birds or fomites) within these poultry production and
trade networks needs to be taken into consideration at all levels. The first objective of this
work was to list the identified routes of AI spread within poultry production and trade net-
works. The second objective was to improve the understanding of the current knowledge and
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gaps on the role of these animal, fomite and human movements within the poultry production
and trade networks on the global AI spread, to inform the need for further research.
Materials and methods
Protocol
A scoping literature review was conducted according to the PRISMA-ScR guidelines (Pre-
ferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping
Reviews) [23,24] (S1 Table). This study followed the methodology proposed by Arksey and
O’Malley [25]: identifying the research question, identifying relevant references, selecting ref-
erences, charting the data, collating, summarizing and reporting the results.
Identifying research questions
The scoping review was conducted to answer the following research questions:
1. What are the identified routes of AI spread?
2. What is the role of animal, human and fomite movements in the global spread of AI within
poultry production and trade networks?
Studies looking at the spread of all AI subtypes (including both LPAI and HPAI) were
included. Global spread through wild birds and more specifically migratory birds was not
included in this review as it has been the focus of a recent review [10]. Moreover, our review
focused only on animal health and not on human health.
Identifying relevant references
Eligibility criteria. This literature search included references published between January
1975 and May 2019 (inclusive), in the English language and with available abstracts.
Information sources. This study used five information sources (CAB Abstract, Web of
Science, Medline, Scopus and Science direct databases) to identify references.
Search. Twelve domains were included in the search, with several keys words for each, i.e.
diffusion (“diffusion OR transmission OR spread”), emergence (“emergence OR introduction
OR outbreak”), epidemiology (“epidemiology”), risk (“risk”), model (“model”), influenza
(“influenza”), avian (“avian OR poultry OR duck OR chicken OR chicks OR geese OR turkey
OR quail OR partridge”), network (“network OR organization OR value-chain”), production
(“production OR company OR farm OR industry OR sector”), trade (“commercial OR trade”),
movement (“traffic OR mobility OR movement”) and domestic (“domestic”). The search algo-
rithm was the following combination of these twelve domains: [(diffusion) OR (emergence)
OR (epidemiology) OR (risk) OR (model)] AND [influenza] AND [avian] AND [(network)
OR (production)] AND [(trade) OR (movement) OR (domestic)]. As an example, the search
request used for Scopus on the 31 Mai 2019 was: (TITLE-ABS-KEY (diffusion OR transmis-
sion OR spread OR emergence OR introduction OR outbreak OR epidemiology OR risk OR
model) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (influenza) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (avian OR poultry OR
duck OR chicken OR chicks OR geese OR turkey OR quail OR partridge) AND TITLE-ABS--
KEY (network� OR organization� OR value-chain OR compan� OR production� OR farm�
OR industr� OR sector) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (commercial OR trade OR traffic OR mobility
OR movement OR domestic)).(S2 Table).
An additional search was performed using Google Scholar to identify any relevant refer-
ences not published in peer-reviewed journals. This search was made following the recom-
mendations of Haddaway et al. on literature search using Google Scholar [26]. The literature
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search using Google Scholar is technically limited because of a specific and simple construction
of the search algorithm with the possibility of using only one “AND” and a limited number of
key words. Because of these limitations, a different search algorithm was used: [“avian influ-
enza” AND [(network) OR (trade) OR (movement)]] with the use of the same key word
domains as previously described. Moreover, as the references have to be imported manually,
the removal of duplicated searches between literature databases and Google search was per-
formed during the screening step to ease the process. Grey literature retrieved from personal
contacts (e.g. FAO reports) and references identified through citations were also included in
this analysis. All references retrieved from the scientific databases were imported into
Zotero1 version 5.0 and duplicate references were removed.
References selection
The references were selected through a first screening phase, based on title, abstract and full
text if necessary using the following exclusion criterion: 1) “references not on AI spread” to
address the first research question. The remaining references were then selected through
another screening phase on abstract and full text if necessary using the following exclusion cri-
teria: 2) “references not within poultry production and trade networks” and 3) “references on
risk factors without considering animal, human or fomite movements”. A flow chart diagram
of the inclusion selection process for publication in this study was developed based on the
PRISMA approach (Fig 1).
Data charting process and data items
A database template was developed in Microsoft Excel1 version 2007 to extract the following
data from the retrieved references from the first screening step: type of routes studied and type
of risk factors studied. Another database template was developed in Microsoft Excel1 version
2007 to extract the following data from the retrieved references from the second screening
step: year, location, study objectives, study type, data source, method to analyse data, type of
network studied, type of movement studied and results (results on AI spread, animal move-
ments, human movements, on the role of these movements in AI spread, other results). A
Fig 1. Flow chart diagram of the study selection process for inclusion in this scoping review.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.g001
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descriptive analysis of the references linked to the review topic was performed at each screen-
ing step and described in this paper.
Synthesis of results
References selected after the first screening step were used to describe the routes of AI spread
between different compartments (commercial farm, production and trade network, wild birds,
etc.). Among these selected references, those focused on risk were analysed separately as they
provided information on the risk of the different AI pathways listed. These references focused
on risk factors were classified according to the following compartments: international trade,
national trade, poultry production network, commercial farm, backyard, environment and
wild birds. The risk factors presented in these references were then categorised according to
the risk of AI transmission analysed: risk of transmission within a compartment (e.g. within
farm) or risk of transmission between compartments (e.g. from wild birds to farm). The result
of this classification was used to build a figure on the different compartments involved in AI
circulation and the transmission pathways between them. The remaining references before the
application of the third selection criteria were classified between the different compartments
considered on this figure. References selected after the second screening step were classified
into three groups following the study objectives. Major results linked to the second research
question were summarized.
Results
This study retrieved 3,978 references from the scientific databases including 2,332 duplicates
and 73 references removed because they were not written in English or were missing an
abstract (Fig 1). Those 362 references were selected to identify the different AI spread pathways
(first research question) (348 on HPAI spread, 12 on LPAI spread and 2 on both). References
not related to poultry production and trade networks or on risk factors without considering
animal, human and fomite movements (308) were removed (Fig 1). In addition to the remain-
ing 54 references, three references from the grey literature and identified through citations
were included at this stage. These 57 references (54 on HPAI spread, 1 on LPAI spread and 2
on both) were used to improve the understanding of the current knowledge and gaps on the
role of these animal and human movements, including fomites, within the poultry production
and trade networks in the spread of AI (second research question).
Identified routes of avian influenza spread
Among the 362 selected references, 276 described the different AI spread pathways while 86,
which focused on risk factors, addressed the risk of these different pathways. Most of the
retrieved references related to AI spread pathways were looking at the poultry production and
trade network level (49/276) and at the commercial farm level (84/276), as our literature search
focused on poultry production and trade networks (Fig 2). Nevertheless, many of the articles
identified were related to the spread of AI in wild birds (108 references, including 32 that dis-
cussed interactions between wild birds and commercial farms while the other references dis-
cussed AI spread within wild bird populations) and backyard (44/276). Only a limited number
of references studied the role of international trade (5/276) and these references were also
selected in this process [27–31].
A large number of references (86) focused only on risk factors including the risk between
and intra-commercial farms and trade and production networks (Table 1). A limited number
of references studied the risk at the interface between trade and production networks and
backyard, environment and wild birds.
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Fig 2. The different compartments of avian influenza virus circulation and links between them: Demonstrated
circulation (plain arrow); suspected circulation (dash arrow). Number without bracket: Number of references
identified on avian influenza (AI) spread at the compartment level. Number with bracket: Non exhaustive number of
references identified on AI spread at the compartment level. Plain arrow: AI pathways from one compartment to
another studied by at least one record on risk factors of AI spread selected by the literature search. Dash arrow:
Possible AI pathways from one compartment to another: not studied by any record on risk factors of AI spread
selected by the literature search.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.g002
Table 1. Classification of the 86 references focusing on risk factors of avian influenza spread according to the compartment studied and/or the transmission path-
way studied. Light grey: less than 5 references, medium grey: between 5 and 20 references, dark grey: more than 20 references.
To
From
International trade National trade
network
National production
network
Commercial farm Backyard Environment Wild birds
International trade 0 1 4 2 0 0 0
National trade network 0 4 0 10 3 0 0
National production
network
0 0 10 13 1 0 0
Commercial farm 0 0 0 28 0 0 0
Backyard 0 2 1 7 NA NA NA
Environment 0 0 0 13 NA NA NA
Wild birds 0 0 8 27 NA NA NA
NA: not applicable, when both compartments (origin and destination) were not included in the search question, i.e. backyard, environment, wild birds. 0: no reference
on the 86 selected references on risk factors studied these transmission pathways.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.t001
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Animal and human movements and avian influenza viruses spread within
poultry production and trade networks
Fifty-seven references remained after the application of the exclusion criteria 2) “references
not related to poultry production and trade networks” and 3)”references on risk factors with-
out considering animal, human and fomite movements” and the addition of references identi-
fied through citations as well as from the grey literature (Fig 1, Table 2, S3 Table).
These references can be divided into three groups according to their main objectives: stud-
ies which aimed to 1) demonstrate the link between animal, human and fomite movements
and AI spread within poultry production and trade networks (28 references); 2) describe ani-
mal, human and fomite movements in a context of AI spread within poultry production and
trade networks (but with no direct demonstration of the link) (20 references); 3) describe the
AI spread within the production and trade networks (without making explicit links to animal,
Table 2. Classification of the selected studies on animal and human movements and AI spread within poultry production and trade networks according to the type
of network studied, the objectives, the type and location of the study.
Classification Type of network
studied
Objectives Type of study Location References
Studies which aimed to demonstrate the link
between animal, human, fomite movements and
AI spread within the poultry production and
trade networks
International trade
network
To determine if the international
spread of HPAI H5N1 was influenced
by the poultry trade from infected
countries
Modelling Asia [30]
To evaluate the risk of introduction
and dissemination of HPAI through
legal and illegal trade
Risk
assessment
Ethiopia, Spain,
Vietnam
[27,29,31]
National or local
trade network
To investigate association
To improve knowledge on live bird
trade
To assess surveillance and control
strategies
To assess biosecurity practices
Modelling China, Indonesia,
Vietnam
[33–35]
Network
analysis
China, Pacific Islands,
Vietnam
[33,36–40]
National or local
production
network
To identify the role of commercial
farms in the persistence and the
spread of AI
To assess surveillance and control
strategies
To assess the risk of AI spread
Modelling France, Netherlands,
UK, USA
[41–51]
Network
analysis
Korea, South Africa,
UK
[51–53]
Risk
assessment
Australia, USA [54–56]
Studies which aimed to describe animal, human
and fomite movements in a context of AI spread
within poultry production and trade networks
(but with no direct demonstration of the link)
International trade
network
To describe genetics value-chain Descriptive
analysis
Global [28]
National trade
network
To describe poultry trade network
To assess surveillance and control
strategies
Network
analysis
Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Kenya, Mali, Vietnam
[32,57–61]
Descriptive
analysis
China, Vietnam [62,63]
National
production
network
To describe the poultry production
network
To assess surveillance and control
strategies
To assess the impact of a potential
HPAI introduction
Network
analysis
China, Egypt,
Indonesia, Kenya,
Nepal, Nigeria,
[64–70]
Descriptive
analysis
Australia, Switzerland,
UK
[71–74]
Studies which aimed to describe AI spread
within the production and trade networks
(without making explicit links to animal, human
and fomite movements)
National trade
network
To analyse AI spread
To assess surveillance and control
strategies
Modelling India, Vietnam [32,75]
National
production
network
Italy, France, Ghana,
Netherland, Nigeria,
USA, Vietnam
[76–83]
UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.t002
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human and fomite movements) (10 references) (Table 2). One of these studies described a live
bird market network and studied AI spread within live bird markets but did not demonstrate
the link between the two [32].
References on AI spread mostly used epidemiological modelling, while references on
animal, human and fomite movements mostly used network analysis. Both approaches
show the link between movements and disease spread: network analysis represents the con-
nections between different units and assesses their relative importance in the network (cen-
trality or connectivity) while disease modelling integrates such movements as parameters.
Two studies actually combined both approaches [33,51]. This combination made it possible
to use the connections described by network analysis as input parameters for the epidemio-
logical model.
It is noteworthy to mention that network analysis studies mainly relied on data taken
from field studies (e.g. cross-sectional interviews) and/or official data (e.g. from the Minis-
try of Agriculture or from national veterinary services) while epidemiological modelling
mostly relied on official data (usually entered in national or global databases) and/or data
from scientific literature. Only three studies included data obtained directly from the pri-
vate poultry industry [42,48,54].
Type of animal and human movements
From the 57 references, 48 studied animal and human movements (Table 2). Movements were
described according the type of network studied (Table 2): international trade network,
national trade network and national production network.
Only a limited number of studies looked at the international trade network and these only
studied animal movements (Table 3): animal genetics trade at the global level [28], live chicken
trade at the regional level (Asia) [30] and risk of disease introduction in a country through
day-old chicks (DOC) [29] or adult bird imports [31]. One reference studied illegal interna-
tional trade of DOC and adult birds between two countries linked to AI spread [27]. Another
reference focused on the national trade network in Cambodia and briefly mentioned illegal
trade from neighbouring countries [61].
At the national level, three types of movement were studied: animal, human and fomite
movements. Overall, all types of production were studied, from breeders to production
birds, including DOC and hatching eggs and a majority of domestic species (chicken broil-
ers, layers, ducks, turkeys, ostriches, quails, indigenous birds). Animal movements are
either movements linked to the trade network or to the production network. Three refer-
ences looked at movements related to the specific structure of a production network: the fat-
tening duck production in France [44], free-grazing duck production in Vietnam [58] and
ostrich production in South-Africa [53]. These production networks require a change of
farm or location for the different stages of growth of the birds, which involves a lot of
between-farm movements. One reference looked at movements linked to poultry shows
[72]. In regard to fomites linked to AI spread, the majority of studies focused on feed deliv-
eries, slaughterhouse vehicles and catching team, then dead bird pick-up, egg transport
(hatching eggs and table eggs), manure management and shared equipment. In terms of
human movements, the most studied populations were poultry companies’ technicians and/
or workers, veterinarians and traders. Some references also considered vaccination and
cleaning and disinfection teams [49] or private individual technicians [70].
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Table 3. Description of the results of the 48 selected references which studied animal, human and fomite movements within poultry production and trade
networks.
Type of movements Species considered References
International movements
International trade of live birds day-old chicks [28,29]
hatching eggs [28]
chickens [30,31]
ducks, turkeys [31]
Illegal trade of live birds spent hens, ducklings, day-old chicks [27]
National movements
Animal movements
Movements in link with the trade network poultry [32–40,57,59–61,63,67]
broiler chickens [64,65,68–70]
layers [65,68,69]
indigenous chickens [65,68,69]
ducks [62,64,69]
Between farms movements ostriches [53]
ducks [44,58]
Movements from hatchery day old chicks, hatching eggs, broiler chickens [43,54,64–
66,68,70,72,73]
day old chick, hatching egg layer [65,68,72,73]
day old duckling, hatching eggs duck [72,73]
ostrich chicks [72]
Movements to poultry show chicken, duck [72]
Fomite movements
Slaughterhouses vehicles ducks [41]
poultry [42,50,51,71]
broiler chickens [47,70,74]
layers [47,74]
Catching team or bird pick up poultry [42,48,71]
broiler chickens [46,47,55,56,74]
layers [46,47,55,56,74]
turkeys and broiler ducks [46]
ready to lay parents and parents and grandparents stock [46]
Feed deliveries poultry [50,52,71]
broiler chickens [43,49,54,65,68,70,73,74]
layers [49,65,68,73,74]
turkeys [49,73,74]
quails and breeders [49]
Egg transport (egg tray, egg pallet, egg collection) layers [45,46,55,56]
parents and grandparents stock [46]
Litter and manure management poultry, ready to lay parents and parents and grandparents
stock
[46]
broiler chickens [43,54,56,70]
layers [56]
Dead birds pick-up broiler chickens [56,73]
layers [72,73]
ducks [72,73]
turkeys [73]
(Continued)
PLOS ONE The role of animal and human movements in the global spread of avian influenza viruses
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567 March 20, 2020 9 / 21
Link between animal and human movements within poultry production
and trade networks and the spread of avian influenza viruses at the
national and international level
From the 48 references, only 28 studied the link between animal and human movements and
AI spread within poultry production and trade networks. These references were classified
according to the type of network studied: international trade network (3/28), illegal trade net-
work (1/28), national trade network (8/28) and national production network (16/28)
(Table 2). None of the references on poultry production network considered the full network
(i.e. from hatchery to slaughter). The references on poultry production networks were all con-
ducted in high-income countries (HIC) while those on national poultry trade networks were
all conducted in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). Moreover, the references on
trade networks all took place in Asia except for one reference (Pacific Islands [36]).
Animal movements at the international level. While looking at trade at the international
level, one study in the Southeast Asia region showed that the risk of a country being infected
increases with the number of live chickens imported [30]. But the model of this study showed
no significant interaction between infection and duck importation and a negative significant
interaction between infection and turkey importation. On the other hand, a risk assessment of
the introduction of HPAI H5N1 infection into Spain showed that the import of ducks was
more at risk than the import of turkeys and chickens [31]. Olive et al. considered the risk of
HPAI introduction in Ethiopia through DOC as negligible [29]. Looking at the risk of HPAI
introduction through illegal trade in Vietnam, Desvaux et al. showed that the live poultry trade
represents a high risk of HPAI introduction and considered that the risk of exposure of chick-
ens in Vietnam was lower after the introduction of DOC than spent hens or ducklings [27].
Table 3. (Continued)
Type of movements Species considered References
Shared equipment free-range layers [56]
broiler chickens [56,70]
Human movements
Traders poultry [32,33,67]
Veterinarian poultry [52]
broiler chickens [65]
layers [65]
ready to lay parents and parents and grandparents stock [46]
Vaccination team broiler chickens, layers, turkeys, quails and breeders [49]
Cleaning and disinfection team broiler chickens, layers, turkeys, quails and breeders [49]
Individual technician broiler chickens [70]
Technician/ company workers ducks [41,72]
poultry [42,50]
broiler chickens [43,49,54,55,72]
turkeys, quails and breeders [49]
layers [49,55,56,72]
Shared farm workers (part-time, hired help) broiler [43,54,56]
layers [56]
Non-company commercial services (gas delivery, meter reading,
maintenance)
broiler [43,54]
Visiting poultry show chickens, ducks [72]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.t003
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Animal movements within the poultry trade network at the national level. Only one
study showed an association between the movements of live poultry and the persistence of AI
viruses at the farm level [36]. The seven others showed the association between live bird mar-
kets and animal movements within trade networks and risk of AI spread. Some studies showed
a significant association between AI infections in live bird markets or in the market location
and the movement of live birds [39,40]. Roche et al. showed the high probability of infection of
a live bird market after movement of live birds from an infected village [35]. Moreover, Four-
nie´ et al. showed that live bird markets with high connectivity in a trade network had a higher
probability of being infected and of infecting other markets [33] and that control measures on
live bird markets such as market closure or rest day reduced the number of secondary cases
per single infected case [34]. Furthermore Soares Magalhaes et al. showed that an increase of
poultry trade (e.g. for Chinese New Year Festivities) influences the risk of poultry and human
AI infections [38]. Live bird markets are indeed central in the trade networks in most Asian
countries. Nonetheless, Martin et al. identified no significant association between movements
within networks and the infectious status of the live bird market in South China [37]. It should
however be noted that in this study the live bird market from counties with previous HPAI
infection history was significantly less connected than the live bird market from counties with
no infection history.
Animal, fomite and human movements within the poultry production network at the
national level. At the poultry production network level, three studies conducted an analysis
of movements at almost all production stages. All studies were at national level: one on fatten-
ing duck production network in France [44], another on poultry production network in the
Netherlands [46] and one on the ostrich production network in South Africa [53]. Moreover,
only two studies also considered breeding stocks [46,49] and one hatching egg movements
[45].
Two studies identified company integration as a pathway for high risk of between-farm AI
transmission [45,54]. Furthermore, two modelling studies established that the wide spread of
AI within poultry production networks is possible, even if the event was rare [42,50].
Two references studied the role of animal movements within poultry production networks
in AI spread. In networks with a lot of between-farm animal movements (e.g. ostriches, fatten-
ing ducks) infected farms were more central and more connected within their network as
compared to the non-infected farms [44,53].
Thirteen references studied the role of fomite movements in AI spread within poultry
production networks. Several studies demonstrated the role of slaughterhouse trucks in the
modelled outbreak size [41,42,50]. Moreover, modelling studies concluded that the implemen-
tation of control measures on this transmission pathway reduced AI spread [47,51]. Moreover,
the role of catching companies or bird pick up networks in the increase of AI spread risk has
been identified [42,47,48,55,56]. Feed deliveries were identified by modelling studies as an
important transmission modality [43,49,50]. Egg transport (including egg tray, egg pallet and
egg collection) was identified as an important disease pathway between layer farms based on
risk assessment [55,56]. Lastly, one study showed that dead bird pick-up can be considered to
be an essential pathway of AI spread and that shared equipment is a possible pathway [56].
Nine references studied the role of human movements within poultry production networks
in AI spread, especially company technicians or workers. Risk assessment studies highlighted
these movements as an important AI risk pathway [55,56]. Modelling studies demonstrated an
association between AI spread and company workers movements [41–43]. Leibler at al. identi-
fied part-time workers as significantly contributing to the increase of AI spread [54]. Move-
ments of veterinarians along with manure, egg transport and catching team movements also
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play a role in AI spread [46]. Infected farms are more central in networks connected by farms
using the same medicine business and the same feed business than non-infected farms [52].
Some references identified multiple transmission routes in AI spread within poultry pro-
duction networks. Live bird movements were considered as a major route of AI spread when
production processes requires live birds movements between farms (e.g. fattening duck or
ostrich) [44,53]. But these movements were considered as a minor route when production pro-
cesses are based on all-in/all-out system (e.g. broiler or layer) [43,45,46,49,54]. While most of
the studies agreed on the other transmission routes to consider (Table 3), the relative impor-
tance of these routes with AI spread differed (Table 4). Sharkey et al. identified that more AI
infections were attributable to integrated company personnel contacts than feed or slaughter
contacts [50]. Dent et al. showed that the highest proportion of outbreaks occurred with inte-
grated company personnel movements [42]. For layer production, the transmission route
most at risk were fomites movements related to egg transport (e.g. egg tray and egg pallets)
compared to other fomite movements (e.g. feed delivery) or human movements (e.g. company
technician, veterinarian, shared farm workers) [45,56]. For broiler production, the results were
more contrasted. Some studies demonstrated that feed delivery and human movements (e.g.
company technician, veterinarian, farm workers) were the routes most at risk [43,54], other
studies identified shared bird pick-up transport (to slaughter) as the most at risk route for AI
spread [46,56].
Discussion
First, this review highlighted the fact that only a limited number of studies looked at the role of
animal, human and fomite movements within poultry production and trade networks in the
spread of AI. All studies describing a link between these movements and AI spread were actu-
ally based on modelling work (e.g. epidemiological, network analysis or risk assessment mod-
els) rather than experimental work. Indeed, it is highly challenging to show evidence of a link
between a specific movement and the cause of an outbreak in the field, given the complexity
and numbers of movements involved. Studies using pre-movement samplings can only show
the presence of the virus but cannot prove that this virus will infect another bird once the
movement has occurred [58]. Most studies are based on modelling and would require field val-
idation to improve our global knowledge on this issue. Moreover, only a few studies used real
AI outbreak data to parameterize the models [37–40,44,52,53].
Table 4. Risk characterisation of AI spread through the different routes within national poultry production networks identified by this literature review.
Type of movement AI spread routes Risk level References
Live animal
movements
Production process which requires live bird movements between farms such as fattening duck or ostrich
productions
High [44,53]
Production process based on all-in/all-out system such as broiler or layer productions Low [43,45,46,49,54]
Chick movements from hatchery Moderate [43,54]
Fomite movements Bird pick-up to slaughter for broiler production High [46,56]
Feed delivery for broiler production High [43,54]
Egg collection for layer production High [45,56]
Manure and litter management Low to
moderate
[43,46,54,56]
Shared equipment Moderate [56]
Human movements Integrated company personnel (manager, staff working on multiple premises, veterinarian) High [42,50]
Human movements associated within in-house contact (company personnel, veterinarian, farm workers) High [43,45,46,54,56]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230567.t004
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The role of human and fomite movements has mostly been studied within national poultry
production networks but never within international poultry production networks (e.g. poultry
production company with production units in several countries). This role should not be
neglected. At the national poultry production network level, studies have shown that human
and fomite movements were more important routes than live bird movements [43,45,46,
49,54]. Indeed, even if the transmission probability through direct contact from one infected
bird to another is the highest of all transmission routes, the probability of this contact occur-
ring is low. This is due to the poultry production process with the all-in and all-out system.
Live birds leaving a farm to go to slaughter ends the transmission risk [45,49]. This process
does not apply to fattening duck and ostrich production networks where live bird movements
play a large role in AI transmission [44,53]. At the national poultry trade level, most studies
made no distinction between traders’ movements and the movements of the poultry that they
trade. It is therefore impossible to identify the link between human and fomite movements
and AI spread in trade networks, even if this link certainly exists, as for the production net-
work. Some articles suggested that the global trade of live domestic birds or poultry by-prod-
ucts may play a major role in the global spread of AI [28,84,85]. Only a few references actually
demonstrated this role and mainly linked to live animal trade networks [27,29–31]. Most of
these studies used risk assessment and this literature review may have missed other risk assess-
ment studies at national or local level due to selecting English written papers only. It would be
interesting to look at this work led by national veterinary services. Nonetheless, as these risk
assessment studies focused at national level, the studies do not usually address the link between
movements and AI spread at global level.
Considering the large number of references on AI in the literature, the structured selection
process using PRISMA-ScR guidelines mitigated the risk of missing key articles in scope with
the research questions. Only two references were identified through subsequent citations,
which highlighted the strength of the search algorithm. The main target of this review was
international and national poultry production and trade networks. However, as farms are an
element of the poultry production and trade networks, many studies initially identified by the
algorithm (and removed with the exclusion criteria) targeted AI spread at farm level only
(within farms or between farms) but not in direct link with the whole network.
Even if a majority of references considered only HPAI spread, this review also looked at
papers focused on LPAI spread [41] or both LP and HP spread [55,56,82]. Indeed, transmis-
sion pathways are highly similar for HPAI and LPAI, even if transmission probability might
vary [55]. Moreover, LPAI are more likely to spread widely than HPAI due to the lack of detec-
tion and reporting [55,56]. Furthermore, Nickbakhsh et al. have shown that LPAI and HPAI
co-infections can lead to a prolongation of HPAI outbreak due to partial cross-protection [82].
LPAI might therefore play a critical role in HPAI surveillance and control performances.
It is also important to note that no references on full production networks (from hatchery
to slaughter) were identified from this review, even if some references looked at movements at
several stages of the whole poultry production network [44,46,53]. One reason could be the
lack of data at some stages of the production network (e.g. hatchery or slaughterhouse). In
addition, when they do exist, data from the private sector are confidential and the veterinary
services and researchers have limited access to them. Similarly, data on poultry production
networks at the international level are not publically accessible essentially due to confidential-
ity issues from private producers [28]. Therefore, all studies rely on public official data, which
are often outdated and of lower precision and quality than private sector data. Access to these
data is key for a full understanding of the role of movements within poultry production and
trade networks in the global spread of AI. Stronger public-private partnerships could facilitate
public data access and improve disease control benefits for the private sector [86,87].
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It is interesting to note that most studies on poultry production networks have been con-
ducted in HIC while all studies on trade networks have been conducted in LMIC. On one
hand, the structure of poultry production networks in LMIC with many small-scale farms
needs live domestic bird trade networks to structure this network. As the biosecurity level on
these small-scale farms is low, they represent a high risk of AI spread in the country. This
could explain why studies conducted in LMIC mostly focused on trade networks. On the other
hand, the trade of live domestic birds in HIC has become marginal compared to the trade of
poultry by-products and poultry production is highly integrated, hence the final product of the
value-chain for the consumers is poultry meat. Poultry trade networks have been well studied
in LMIC, especially during the 2004–2006 H5N1 pandemic waves, and their role in dissemi-
nating AI viruses has been evidenced. Live bird markets have been identified as a major source
of human infections [88]. Poultry production networks including international ones are pres-
ent in LMIC and sharply connected to traditional farming (backyard) and live bird trade [89].
Only a few reports described the poultry value-chain in developing countries with high poultry
production, in particular Egypt [90] and Indonesia [69,91] and with mid-size poultry produc-
tion, i.e. Kenya [65,92] and Nepal [68]. Yet, this description was only intended to provide
information for biosecurity, surveillance and control measures rather than trying to under-
stand the role of animal and human mobility within these networks in the spread of AI. Lim-
ited data access and possibility of intervention could explain why studies led by international
organisations have focused on backyard, semi-commercial and trade networks, including live
bird markets.
At the international level, live poultry and the poultry by-product trade is controlled by
trade regulations issued by the OIE [93]. If a country wants to export live poultry and poultry
by-products, its national regulatory authorities have to provide evidence that the country or
zone/compartment within the country is free of AI. For this, they should use active and passive
surveillance, according to the recommendations of the OIE Terrestrial Code 2018 [93]. AI out-
breaks have huge consequences on international trade; even a short-term crisis can have a long
term impact on trading patterns and policy decisions as well as on industry development [94].
For example, following the 2003–2004 HPAI H5N1 epidemic in South East Asia, Japan
stopped importing frozen poultry meat from China and Thailand and increased its importa-
tions from Brazil [95]. The economic impact of the 2003–2004 H5N1 AI wave in Thailand due
to trade bans was estimated at almost 1.5% of gross domestic product [96]. Taking the US as
another example, trade bans imposed by trading partners after the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreaks
were valued at almost 14% of the year’s total trade revenue [97]. Nevertheless, the potential
role of trade in the risk of global spread of animal diseases has been discussed but not exten-
sively studied, as shown in this review work.
The role of wild birds in the dissemination of AI viruses has been extensively studied [10].
Phylogenetic epidemiology can provide clues to identify the source of introduction and spread
modalities of AI [7,98]. Nonetheless, in some cases, the initial source of introduction of the
virus has never been clearly evidenced, especially between infected wild birds or contaminated
movements within international poultry trade and production networks. This work has
highlighted the fact that, even if wild birds were contributing to AI spread and maintenance at
the global level, other factors including animal, human and fomite movements within poultry
production and trade networks play a role in the global spread of AI. Although every context is
different depending on the countries considered, it would be interesting to run a comparative
risk analysis on the risk of introduction and spread of AI from wild birds or within poultry
production and trade network movements at the global level.
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Conclusion
Despite the intensive circulation of AI in the last 15 years and the large number of studies that
have examined its spread, this review has shown that only a limited number of studies have
been focused on the role played by animal, human and fomite movements in this spread
within poultry production and trade networks. Most studies have described the different AI
spread routes, but without looking at the risk associated with these routes, especially between
commercial farms and the rest of the production and trade networks. This work has confirmed
that production and trade networks are considered to play a role in AI spread but they have
only been studied partially. Animal movements play an important role in AI spread within
national trade networks whereas human and fomite movements play an important role in AI
spread within national poultry production networks. Nevertheless, this has never been demon-
strated with field data. Although, the international legal and illegal trade of live poultry is rec-
ognised as possible routes of AI spread between countries, this has never been directly studied.
A more holistic approach to the AI circulation routes including all compartments, such as
commercial farms, production and trade networks, wild birds, environment and backyard, is
essential to fully understand the global spread of AI and to inform relevant surveillance and
control strategies. The complexity of poultry production and of AI spread is most likely part of
the reasons for these gaps, but the limited access to production and trade data for public
researchers is definitely a barrier to this knowledge. There is therefore a need to study the role
of animal, human and fomite movements within poultry production and trade networks in the
global spread of AI in partnership with both public and private actors to fill this gap.
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